This paper studies project financing when the entrepreneur derives reputation benefits from investor backing and learns privately about failure. Continued backing improves the market's perception of the project and gives the entrepreneur a reason to delay disclosure. The investor designs a contract to obtain failure information while controlling funding and compensation costs. I show the optimal contract features early discipline, with prompt disclosure and termination, followed by failure tolerance, with delayed disclosure. Allowing delay later weakens the market's interpretation of continued funding and reduces the cost of inducing early disclosure. The model predicts a startup hype cycle, bimodal termination times and systematic variation in failure tolerance across investors and ventures.

A cashless entrepreneur designs a contract backed by future cash flows to raise funds from an informed investor. The entrepreneur can exert costly effort to improve payoff relevant outcome where the marginal benefit depends on the quality of the project. The quality of the project is observed privately by the investors. This paper studies the optimal contract that an entrepreneur proposes to an investor given these two specific information frictions. In equilibrium, a trade-off emerges between the surplus maximization of projects of different qualities. In particular, this tradeoff creates an endogenous preference for risk by the entrepreneur when designing the menu of contracts. The results are applied to predict the effect of divergence in the entrepreneur's subjective beliefs on the project's outcome and overall efficiency in the economy.

We study price discrimination in markets where consumers search across firms and obtain discounts by incurring time costs. Consumers differ in their valuation of time relative to money, shaping both search behavior and menu choice. Under regularity conditions, firms pool consumers with low and high time costs and screen intermediate types through higher prices and shorter time requirements. When screening occurs, prices jump at its lower boundary but remain continuous at its upper boundary. Screening also lowers the top price relative to uniform pricing for the same consumer group: raising it would increase the time costs needed to preserve incentive compatibility elsewhere in the menu.